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Accession Number ADA589995
Title Analysis of the T+X Program and a Proposal for a New Pilot.
Publication Date Jul 2013
Media Count 22p
Personal Author J. M. Huff J. W. Wenger Y. K. Pinelis
Abstract Traditionally, the Navy has set sailors initial contract lengths to ensure a return on investment (ROI) from sailors training. The current mix of 4- , 5-, and 6-year Navy enlistment contracts is partially a result of this ROI framework. However, this approach is not necessarily aligned with the sea-shore flow. We find that many sailors end of active obligated service (EAOS) comes before the end of their first prescribed sea tour (PST), which follows training. Because those sailors whose EAOS doesn't cover their PST complete their PSTs at much lower rates, we conclude that aligning PST and EAOS by increasing initial obligation would increase overall sea tour completion rates. The T+X pilot does exactly that for several ratings. The program started in 2011, so our data on its participants are fairly recent. Nevertheless, with the caveat that our analysis is based on a small sample over a short period of time, we find that, so far, there is no evidence that lengthening obligations for T+X sailors has changed recruit composition or early attrition rates. Based on these findings, we present simplified estimates of cost savings resulting from lengthening obligations in T+X ratings. These savings range from $7.35 million to $11.67 million per year, depending on economic conditions. Finally, we discuss the shortcomings of the data on enlistment incentives and the ways it prevents us from precisely identifying the cost of extra commitment from recruits. We also suggest ideas for future pilot programs, including several randomized experiments, which would help fill the current data gaps.
Keywords Contracts
Eaos(End of active obligated service)
Enlistment incentives
Naval personnel
Prd(Planned rotation date)
Sea tour incompletions
T-x pilot

Source Agency Non Paid ADAS
NTIS Subject Category 70D - Personnel Management, Labor Relations & Manpower Studies
88D - Personnel
92A - Job Training & Career Development
Corporate Author Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA.
Document Type Technical report
Title Note Final rept.
NTIS Issue Number 1409
Contract Number N00014-11-D-0323

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