Documents in the NTIS Technical Reports collection are the results of federally funded research. They are directly submitted to or collected by NTIS from Federal agencies for permanent accessibility to industry, academia and the public.  Before purchasing from NTIS, you may want to check for free access from (1) the issuing organization's website; (2) the U.S. Government Printing Office's Federal Digital System website http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys; (3) the federal government Internet portal USA.gov; or (4) a web search conducted using a commercial search engine such as http://www.google.com.
Accession Number ADA583990
Title Imperial Japanese Navy Campaign Planning and Design of the Aleutian- Midway Campaign.
Publication Date May 2013
Media Count 44p
Personal Author J. J. Gross
Abstract In May 1942, the Japanese found themselves in a favorable military situation. Previous successes had convinced Japanese naval planners that it was now possible to produce a strategic victory that could end the war through a negotiated peace. Employing the largest combined fleet of the war, the Aleutian- Midway campaign intended to satisfy that purpose. Merging the traditional battle fleet with battle proven aircraft carriers, the plan incorporated almost every major combat vessel in the Japanese Navy. Commitment of such a large force was intended to produce a high certainty for the successful accomplishment of three objectives: occupation of Midway Atoll, neutralization of the American threat from the Aleutians, and destruction of the American carrier task force. Thus, by securing the last remaining gaps in the Japanese defensive perimeter and destroying the only remaining surface threat to the Japanese homeland, the Japanese would, thereby, ensure a militarily favorable operating posture. Japanese victory in this operation conceivably would eliminate the American capability or desire to continue operations against Japan. With overwhelming combat power committed to this operation, success seemed certain. Since victory did not result from this operation, relative combat power was not the deciding factor in the battle. A new examination of the Aleutian-Midway campaign provides fresh lessons about the challenges of operational planning, both then and now. The insights provided by contemporary operational art and design were used to reinterpret the campaign. U.S. concepts dealing with operational art and operational design provide a list of planning factors that point to the errors the Japanese made during operational planning. The type of errors made along with the historical evidence of Japanese actions provide a basis for assessing the cultural, organizational, and leadership factors that prevented more effective planning and a more successful operation.
Keywords Admiral yamamoto isoroku
Aircraft carriers
Aleutian islands
Aleutian-midway campaign
Campaign planning
Carrier task forces
Decisive battle concept
Employment of forces
Errors
Failure
Fleets(Ships)
Imperial japanese navy
Japan
Japan kaigun
Leadership
Midway island
Military forces(Foreign)
Military history
Naval planning
Naval warfare
Navy
Operational art
Operational planning
Pacific ocean
Preparation
Second world war
Tactical warfare

 
Source Agency Non Paid ADAS
NTIS Subject Category 92D - Education, Law, & Humanities
74 - Military Sciences
74G - Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics
Corporate Author Army Command and General Staff Coll., Fort Leavenworth, KS. School of Advanced Military Studies.
Document Type Technical report
Title Note Monograph.
NTIS Issue Number 1402
Contract Number N/A

Science and Technology Highlights

See a sampling of the latest scientific, technical and engineering information from NTIS in the NTIS Technical Reports Newsletter

Acrobat Reader Mobile    Acrobat Reader