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Accession Number ADA583871
Title General Creighton Abrams and the Operational Approach of Attrition in the Vietnam War.
Publication Date May 2013
Media Count 60p
Personal Author T. D. Frohnhoefer
Abstract General Creighton Abrams assumed command of U.S. Armed Forces in the Republic of South Vietnam in the summer of 1968. This change in leadership has been viewed as a radical departure from the operational approach implemented by his predecessor, General William Westmoreland. This monograph proposes that U.S. Armed Forces in South Vietnam consistently followed a strategy of attrition from the introduction of battalion-sized combat troops in 1965 through the Westmoreland-Abrams transition, and encouraged the South Vietnamese to follow this strategy during the period of Vietnamization. The National Command Authority and General Westmoreland adopted a strategy of attrition in February of 1966. The Military Assistance Command-Vietnam implemented this strategy throughout 1966 and accelerated it in 1967, when General Abrams became General Westmoreland's deputy commander. The operations were designed to attrite Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regular forces as outlined in the 1966 meeting. The Tet offensive of January 1968 appeared to discredit the strategy of attrition and contributed to the ouster of Westmoreland and his replacement by General Abrams. General Abrams promoted a one-war strategy that had the desired end-state of population security for the people of South Vietnam. In reality, the one-war was a multi-tiered strategy of attrition. The training of South Vietnamese forces was predicated on their capability to conduct attrition warfare upon the departure of American forces. Despite claims of a radical shift to counterinsurgency and pacification operations, General Abrams continued the strategy he inherited from his predecessor. In turn, he passed it on to the South Vietnamese.
Keywords Abrams creighton w
Leadership changes
Leadership strategy
Mac-v(Military assistance command-vietnam)
Military commanders
Military forces(United states)
Operational approach
Phoenix program
South vietnam
Tet offensive
Westmoreland william c

Source Agency Non Paid ADAS
NTIS Subject Category 70B - Management Practice
92D - Education, Law, & Humanities
74G - Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics
Corporate Author Army Command and General Staff Coll., Fort Leavenworth, KS. School of Advanced Military Studies.
Document Type Technical report
Title Note Monograph.
NTIS Issue Number 1402
Contract Number N/A

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