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Accession Number ADA583864
Title Army's Core Competencies.
Publication Date May 2013
Media Count 67p
Personal Author R. E. Dunning
Abstract In October 2011, the United States Army published doctrine espousing its newest core competencies: Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM) and Wide Area Security (WAS). The Army's use of the term 'core competencies' introduced questions of validity since the Army failed to provide a common understanding of the terms, methods for competency identification, or their applicability in capability-based planning or operations. The use of these terms is neither academic nor arbitrary, as they are required by U.S. Code Title 10, Department of Defense Directives, defense acquisitions, and joint doctrine. Core competency theory originated when Prahalad and Hamel introduced the terms in their 1990 Harvard Business Review article in which they also outlined the roots of competitive advantage and the linkage of core competencies, core products, and value in end products. Firms follow methods to identify core competencies using definitions, characteristics, and properties to make resource and strategy decisions to outperform their competition. The currently espoused Army core competencies are not based on this business theory and therefore fail to provide the same value that businesses realize. Improperly identifying core competencies places the Army at risk of expending precious resources and time towards the wrong assets and strategies. Placing core competencies in Army operations doctrine only exacerbates the poor adaptation of business theory. The Army's difficulty in identifying core competencies indicates the need for developing the theory that includes definitions and methods of identification. If the Army can correctly identify its core competencies, it can better manage capabilities in a resource-constrained environment and design strategies and approaches that capitalize on organizational strengths.
Keywords Arab revolt
Arabs
Area security
Army
Army doctrine
Bedouin revolt
Capabilities-based approach
Capability-based forces
Combined arms maneuver
Core competencies
Department of defense
Egypt
Identification
Israel
Joint capabilities management
Joint military activities
Military capabilities
Military doctrine
Military history
Ottoman turkish rule
Theory
Toyota
Turkey
Validation
Wal-mart
Wide area security
Yom kippur war

 
Source Agency Non Paid ADAS
NTIS Subject Category 92D - Education, Law, & Humanities
74 - Military Sciences
74G - Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics
Corporate Author Army Command and General Staff Coll., Fort Leavenworth, KS. School of Advanced Military Studies.
Document Type Technical report
Title Note Monograph.
NTIS Issue Number 1402
Contract Number N/A

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