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Accession Number ADA583823
Title Combining Concepts: Operational Shock in Insurgencies.
Publication Date May 2013
Media Count 69p
Personal Author R. J. Bulger
Abstract The focus of this work is to determine whether the concept of operational shock, which has served as the intellectual underpinning of the U.S. Army's doctrine over the past 30 years, can be used to guide an operational approach in a counterinsurgency campaign. The American way of war now focuses not on the destruction of an enemy's equipment and personnel, but on degrading and disrupting his ability to continue to fight. Much of counterinsurgency doctrine and theory does not fit this operational logic. The previous decade of war has led to a renewed debate both in public and inside the national security apparatus of the United States. With the publication of Field Manual 3-24: 'Counterinsurgency,' the United States produced its first doctrine dedicated to countering insurgency in over 20 years. The logic within FM 3-24 dictates that if the counterinsurgent can dissolve the conditions that enabled the existence of the insurgency, governmental forces can change the logic of the population. The monograph posits that to effectively set conditions to affect the logic of the population, the counterinsurgent must affect the logic of the insurgency it is opposing. The intent is neither to prove nor disprove either the enemy-centric or population-centric models of counterinsurgency, but instead to argue that there must be a balance of both approaches. There may be a time during a counterinsurgency campaign in which the disruption of the insurgency's logic, and causing a fractionalization within the enemy system should be the focus of the counterinsurgent's operations. The monograph examines the theoretical basis for both operational and counterinsurgent doctrine. It then combines these two concepts to provide a theoretical model of an insurgency in a state of shock. Two historical case studies are presented in which the counterinsurgent force, using different force structures and capabilities, were able to effectively shock the systems of the insurgencies they opposed. It identifies characteristics of each of the campaigns that facilitated the application of the appropriate force against the appropriate structures within the insurgency. These characteristics include a networked approach to operations, rapid adaptation of operational approach, and the application of violence in contested space.
Keywords Al-qaeda in iraq
Army doctrine
Asymmetric warfare
Case studies
Civilian population
Complexity theory
Counterinsurgency doctrine
Dhofar insurgency
Enemy-centric models
Iraqi freedom operation
Iraqi war
Jaysh al-mahdi
Loss of operational control
Military doctrine
Military forces(Foreign)
Military forces(United states)
Operational doctrine
Operational shock
Population-centric models
Systems theory
United kingdom

Source Agency Non Paid ADAS
NTIS Subject Category 92D - Education, Law, & Humanities
74 - Military Sciences
74G - Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics
Corporate Author Army Command and General Staff Coll., Fort Leavenworth, KS. School of Advanced Military Studies.
Document Type Technical report
Title Note Monograph.
NTIS Issue Number 1402
Contract Number N/A

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