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Accession Number ADA582553
Title Approximately Strategy-Proof Voting.
Publication Date Apr 2011
Media Count 21p
Personal Author E. Birrell R. Pass
Abstract The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem establishes that only dictatorial voting rules are strategy-proof; under any other voting rule, players have an incentive to lie about their true preferences. We consider a new approach for circumventing this result we consider randomized voting rules that only approximate a deterministic voting rule and only are approximately strategy-proof. We show that any deterministic voting rule can be approximated by an approximately strategy-proof randomized voting rule and we provide asymptotically tight lower bounds on the parameters required by such voting rules.
Keywords Dictatorial voting
Econometrica
Elections
Gibbard satterthwaite theorem
Strategy
Strategy proof voting
Voting rules

 
Source Agency Non Paid ADAS
NTIS Subject Category 92 - Behavior & Society
74G - Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics
Corporate Author Cornell Univ., Ithaca, NY. Dept. of Computer Science.
Document Type Technical report
Title Note Technical rept.
NTIS Issue Number 1326
Contract Number FA9550-08-1-0197

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