Accession Number ADA581956
Title Third-Party Opportunism and the (In)Efficiency of Public Contracts.
Publication Date Jul 2012
Media Count 67p
Personal Author M. W. Moszoro P. T. Spiller
Abstract The lack of exibility in public procurement design and implementation reflects public agents' political risk adaptation to limit hazards from opportunistic third parties--political opponents, competitors, interest groups--while externalizing the associated adaptation costs to the public at large. Reduced exibility limits the likelihood of opportunistic challenge lowering third parties' expected gains and increasing litigation costs. We provide a comprehensible theoretical framework with empirically testable predictions.
Keywords Contract administration
Government procurement
Opportunism
Political economy
Political processes
Transaction costs


 
Source Agency Non Paid ADAS
NTIS Subject Category 70B - Management Practice
92 - Behavior & Society
74E - Logistics, Military Facilities, & Supplies
Corporate Author California Univ., Berkeley. School of Business Administration.
Document Type Technical report
Title Note Conference paper.
NTIS Issue Number 1326
Contract Number N/A

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