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Accession Number ADA566702
Title Operational Art Requirements in the Korean War.
Publication Date May 2012
Media Count 56p
Personal Author J. T. Ziegler
Abstract Historical examples are an expedient way to develop an understanding of operational art theory and concepts. A historical illustration of both operational success and failure is the Korean War. Several aspects of the Korean War remain relevant to operational art in contemporary conflicts. It had a complex and evolving strategy, a dramatic interplay of tactical successes and failures, uncertainty and miscalculation, shortages of means to accomplish ends, and the difficult challenge of setting the conditions for a satisfactory conclusion to the conflict. America's full-scale involvement in the Korean War began on 25 June 1950, when the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) invaded the south, intent on reunifying the country through force of arms. In little more than a month, aided by the element of surprise and superiority in almost every category of military performance, the NKPA captured nearly 90% percent of the Korean Peninsula. MacArthur's conceptualization and execution of Operation Chromite was a brilliant example of operational art. The amphibious assault at Inchon and subsequent breakout of the Pusan Perimeter by the Eighth Army achieved the strategic objective -- the preservation of the Republic of Korea. Then, after a hasty reassessment of strategic priorities, MacArthur led the United Nations forces in a disastrous attack into North Korea. During this period, operational art requirements were absent, and communist China intervened in the conflict. The United Nations forces were nearly defeated. After a withdrawal from North Korea, the United Nations forces were able to reorient and stabilize the conflict primarily due to the superb leadership and vision of General Matthew Ridgway. An examination of three distinct operational periods in the Korean War using the requirements of operational art as described in 'Army Doctrinal Publication 3-0 Unified Land Operations' will reveal whether operational art was a factor in success or failure in the Korean War.
Keywords Amphibious operations
Army doctrinal publication 3-0
Chromite operation
Communist chinese forces
Eighth army
Inchon landings
Korean war
Lessons learned
Macarthur douglas
Military commanders
Military doctrine
Military forces(Foreign)
Military forces(United states)
Military history
Nkpa(North korean people's army)
North korea
Operational art
Pusan perimeter breakout
Ridgway matthew b
South korea
Unified land operations
United nations
United nations counteroffensive
United nations forces

Source Agency Non Paid ADAS
NTIS Subject Category 92D - Education, Law, & Humanities
74G - Military Operations, Strategy, & Tactics
Corporate Author Army Command and General Staff Coll., Fort Leavenworth, KS. School of Advanced Military Studies.
Document Type Technical report
Title Note Monograph.
NTIS Issue Number 1307
Contract Number N/A

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