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Accession Number ADA562549
Title U.S.-Russian Arms Control: A New Paradigm.
Publication Date Feb 2012
Media Count 34p
Personal Author A. M. Berrier
Abstract The United States and Russia concluded the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (NST) in April 2010. The Obama Administration sees the treaty as a key step in its campaign to reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapons and material worldwide, and the administration clearly wants another arms control agreement with Russia to lend more support to that effort. However, the conclusion of another bilateral agreement could prove problematic. The United States and Russia have several major differences in strategic outlook, doctrine, and weapons development that will get in the way. The United States, for example, believes that terrorist groups and rouge states armed with nuclear weapons pose a far bigger threat to security than Russia's nuclear arsenal does. Its doctrine and weapons development focus on nonproliferation and missile defense. Russia still views the United States, NATO, and China as major threats and relies on nuclear weapons to offset perceived imbalances in conventional capability. Instead of attempting to conclude another 'traditional' bilateral arms control treaty, this paper argues that the two sides would be better served by focusing on other nonproliferation and threat reduction activities that better support the long-term security requirements of both countries.
Keywords Agreements
Antimissile defense systems
Arms control
Barack obama
Bilateral arms control agreements
China
Deterrence
European missile defense system
Iran
Military capabilities
Military doctrine
Military modernization
Multilateral agreements
National security
Nato
New strategic arms reduction treaty
Nonnuclear deterrence
Nonnuclear strategic weapons
North korea
Npr(Nuclear posture review report)
Nuclear doctrine
Nuclear materials security
Nuclear nonproliferation
Nuclear terrorism
Nuclear weapons
Perception(Psychology)
Prompt global strike
Rogue states
Russia
Strategic nuclear weapons
Strategic outlook
Tactical nuclear weapons
Terrorists
Threats
United states government
Vulnerability


 
Source Agency Non Paid ADAS
NTIS Subject Category 92 - Behavior & Society
92B - Psychology
57T - Psychiatry
74H - Nuclear Warfare
Corporate Author Army War Coll. Strategic Studies Inst., Carlisle Barracks, PA.
Document Type Technical report
Title Note Research paper.
NTIS Issue Number 1225
Contract Number N/A

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